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I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 1, 1863, Abraham Lincoln declared all slaves 
in the Confederate States to be free through his Emancipation 
Proclamation. It was a significant step toward the national 
abolition of slavery—it was neither the first nor the last step. It 
also violated the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation 
requirement. Following the Civil War, the Supreme Court 
attempted to rectify this constitutional crisis by ruling that the 
Constitution did not apply to the states in rebellion during the 
war.1 Following the War, the Thirteenth Amendment formally 
made slavery unconstitutional throughout the United States. 
Had the Emancipation Proclamation applied to the northern 
states, it would have constituted a Fifth Amendment taking. 
However, it was not a taking because it only applied to the 
southern states which did not receive Constitutional protection, 
according to the Court in Texas v. White.2 
Section II will show the Constitutional basis for a 
governmental taking; Section III will examine the value that 
slavery represented to the Confederacy and the South’s 
economic motivation for perpetuating slavery. Section IV will 
analyze the Supreme Court’s removal of Constitutional 
                                                 
1 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 703 (1868). 
2 Id. 
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protections for the Confederacy in its Texas v. White decision. 
Section V will reconcile the Emancipation Proclamation, the 
White decision, and the Thirteenth Amendment in this context. 
II. A TAKING IN 1863 
A. FEDERAL AUTHORITY FOR TAKING 
Eminent domain is the power of the government to take 
private property for public use.3 The Framers recognized the 
potential for the public good to outweigh the need to preserve 
private property rights. The Fifth Amendment in the Bill of 
Rights addressed this circumstance, stating: “No person shall . 
. . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.” 4  This provision is important 
because it guarantees that the federal government cannot take 
an individual’s property without compensating him, nor could 
it deny him due process regarding the taking. 
For most of the nineteenth century, the federal 
government did not have the power to exercise eminent 
domain over real property; that was exclusively a state power.5 
In 1860, while debating federal legislation regarding 
condemnation of land in California, then-Senator Jefferson 
Davis said: 
The men who framed this Government looked 
with great jealousy to the encroach of the Federal 
power on the domain of the States. Hence the 
expressions of the Constitution are very 
guarded; and I cannot believe that the character 
of property which it was in consideration that 
the Government might take for public uses, by 
making just compensation therefore, was the 
real estate or land lying within the limits of a 
State. I rather suppose it was that character of 
property which might be needed for immediate 
use—horses, corn, and other things which may 
                                                 
3 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. 
4 Id. 
5 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 369 (1875). 




be necessary for the Government to use 
immediately, such as a transport ship; but real 
estate within the limits of a State I think the 
Government should only acquire, first by 
consent of the people, and then under the 
operations of laws enacted by the State.6  
In 1875, the Supreme Court held in Kohl v. United States that an 
act of Congress which appropriated funds “to obtain by 
purchase, or to obtain by condemnation in the courts” real 
estate to construct post offices in Boston and Cincinnati 
indicated that Congress anticipated the need to take the real 
estate against the will of the owner.7 Through this holding, the 
Court extended the federal government’s eminent domain 
power to include real property.8  
While the Fifth Amendment required just compensation 
for a federal government taking, that protection did not apply 
to the states. In Barron v. Baltimore, the Supreme Court held that 
the Constitution applied exclusively to the federal government. 
The Court’s justification was that the states were free to impose 
limitations on themselves through their own constitutions. The 
Court said:  
The powers they conferred on this government 
were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations 
on power, if expressed in general terms, are 
naturally, and, we think, necessarily, applicable 
to the government created by the instrument. 
They are limitations of power granted in the 
instrument itself; not of distinct governments, 
framed by different persons and for different 
purposes.9  
There, to improve city infrastructure and improve drainage, the 
city of Baltimore created several new roads and diverted 
several streams from draining into the Chesapeake Bay. 10 
                                                 
6 Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1790 (1860). 
7 Kohl, 91 U.S. 367 at 369. 
8 William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 
YALE L.J. 1738, 1777 (2013). 
9 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833). 
10 Id. at 244. 
4                     6 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2019) 
 
Barron owned a wharf on that bay. Following these 
infrastructure improvements, the water level in the area of the 
wharf was significantly lower. The new level prevented larger 
ships from docking at the wharf, causing Barron to lose dock 
fees from these ships.11 Barron sued Baltimore, alleging the city 
violated his Fifth Amendment right to just compensation.12 The 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the city, holding that the city 
could not violate Barron’s right to just compensation because 
the Fifth Amendment only applied to the federal government. 
The Fifth Amendment’s eminent domain power and 
just compensation requirement was substantially narrower in 
1863 than the modern version. Specifically, that power only 
applied to personal property and only required just 
compensation only when the federal government did the 
taking.13 
B. SLAVES AS PROPERTY 
The Constitution recognized slaves as property from its 
inception. For example, Article IV, section two, clause three:   
No person held to service or labour in one state, 
under the laws thereof, escaping into another, 
shall, in consequence of any law or regulation 
therein, be discharged from such service or 
labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the 
party to whom such service or labour may be 
due.14 (emphasis added) 
In 1859, the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia held in U.S. 
v. Amy that the government owed no compensation to a slave 
owner when the slave committed a crime that required the slave 
to be jailed. No compensation was warranted because jailing 
the slave only incidentally burdened the property rights of the 
owner.15 The court further examined slaves as property: 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 245. 
13 See Kohl, 91 U.S. at 367, 369; Barron, 32 U.S. at 243, 247. 
14 The Thirteenth Amendment repealed this clause. 
15 U.S. v. Amy, 24 F.Cas. 792, 810 (C.C.D. Va. 1859).  




In expounding this law, we must not lose sight 
of the twofold character which belongs to the 
slave. He is a person, and also property. As 
property, the rights of the owner are entitled to 
the protection of the law. As a person, he is 
bound to obey the law, and may, like any other 
person, be punished if he offends against it; and 
he may be embraced in the provisions of the law, 
either by the description of property or as a 
person, according to the subject-matter upon 
which congress or a state is legislating. 
(emphasis added)  
In contrast, Congress exercised its direct control of Washington, 
D.C. when it passed the Compensated Emancipation Act in 
1862, a law freeing all slaves in the District of Columbia.16 This 
law compensated all slaveholders three hundred dollars per 
slave. Both the law and Amy recognized that slaves were 
people; both recognized that slaves were also property. The 
circuit court did so explicitly, while the Congress did so 
implicitly by complying with the Fifth Amendment. 
By June of 1862, attitudes toward compensation for 
emancipation had changed. Congress acted consistently with 
Amy by freeing all slaves in the territories without 
compensation. 17  This likely violated the Fifth Amendment, 
according to Barron v. Baltimore, because the territories derived 
their power from the federal Constitution, not a state 
constitution.18 Both Amy and Dred Scott v. Sandford,19 one of the 
most famous Supreme Court cases in American history, 
recognize slaves were property. Congress also endorsed this 
idea by compensating slave owners in the District of Columbia 
for emancipation. By the standards of the time, the Fifth 
Amendment required just compensation for emancipating the 
territories, yet none was given. 
In 1862, Congress again recognized that emancipation 
required compensation when it passed a resolution stating that 
Northern states could voluntarily emancipate in exchange for 
                                                 
16 12 Stat. 376, 377 (1862). 
17 12 Stat. 432 (1862). 
18 Baude, supra note 8, at 1792-93.  
19 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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compensation. 20  President Lincoln famously wrote to the 
Philadelphia Inquirer newspaper encouraging the states to 
accept the proposal.21 The states did not accept the proposal, 
but it demonstrated Congress’s recognition of the Fifth 
Amendment requirement of compensation for emancipation. 
Congress passed two statutes that permitted Northern 
slave owners whose slaves fought for the Union Army to file a 
claim with the federal government for the loss of that slave’s 
services.22 The only requirements to file a claim were proof of 
ownership of the slave and proof of the slave’s military 
service. 23  A successful claim earned the slave-owner three 
hundred dollars and the slave his freedom.24 Of note, section 
twenty-four of the act says “award to each loyal person to 
whom a colored volunteer may owe service a just 
compensation.”25 (emphasis added) 
Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution is evidence that 
the Framers viewed slaves as property that warranted 
protection from the federal government. Compensation claims 
based on voluntary military service show a contemporaneous 
acceptance of the Framer’s notion during the Civil War period. 
The notion that slaves were the type of property the Fifth 
Amendment was designed to protect is further shown by the 
term “just compensation” in the military service compensation 
act—the exact language used in the Fifth Amendment. 
On this basis, Congress regarded slaves as property like 
any other, making just compensation due for their 
emancipation. This attitude was likely derived from slavery’s 
significant economic value and reinforced by the Court’s 
decision in Dred Scott. 
                                                 
20 H.R.J. Res. No. 26, 37th Cong. (1862). 
21 Abraham Lincoln, Message From the President, PHILADELPHIA 
INQUIRER (Mar. 7, 1862), available at 
https://www.sethkaller.com/item/1346-30001.28-Lincoln’s-
Compensated-Emancipation-Proposal. 
22 ST. LOUIS COUNTY LIBRARY, SLAVE COMPENSATION CLAIMS, U.S. 
COLORED TROOPS (2018), available at 
https://www.slcl.org/content/slave-compensation-claims-us-
colored-troops-index-last-name-soldier. 
23 13 Stat. 11 (1864).     
24 Id. 
25 Id. 




III. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A SLAVE 
A. DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD EXPLICITLY CALLS SLAVES 
PROPERTY 
Dred Scott was a slave purchased by John Emerson in 
1832.26 Emerson took Scott with him when he moved around 
the country; first from Virginia to Missouri, then throughout the 
Northwest Territory, and finally to Wisconsin. While they were 
in Wisconsin, Congress passed the Missouri Compromise, 
which outlawed slavery north of Missouri, including in 
Wisconsin.27 Emerson left Scott in Wisconsin, with Scott’s wife 
and children, when Emerson moved to Louisiana. 28  In 1843, 
Emerson died in Missouri, leaving his estate to his wife, Irene 
Sanford, including Scott and his family.29 Scott sued Sanford for 
his and his family’s freedom in Missouri. The Supreme Court of 
Missouri ruled for Sanford because Missouri was a slave state. 
Scott sued in federal court, eventually appealing to the United 
States Supreme Court.30 
The Supreme Court held that Scott had no standing to 
sue because he was not a United States citizen by sole virtue of 
his race.31 In its holding, the Court continued: “[t]he only two 
clauses in the Constitution which point to this race, treat them 
as persons whom it was morally lawful to deal in as articles of 
property and to hold as slaves.” 32 (emphasis added) The Court 
expanded Scott’s lack of citizenship to all people of African 
descent.33 
The Court’s rationale was that its job was to interpret the 
Constitution as written, not influence public policy. Chief 
                                                 
26 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 397 (1857). 
27 Specifically, the Missouri Compromise outlawed slavery north of 
36°30’, permitted Missouri to enter the Union as a slave state, Maine 
to enter as a free state, and required new states to enter the Union is 
pairs: one free, one slave. Roberta Alexander, Dred Scott: The Decision 
That Sparked a Civil War, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 643, 644 (2007). 
28 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 397-98. 
29 Due to a clerical error, Sanford’s name was spelled “Sandford” in 
the case name. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393, 397. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 394. 
32 Id. at 393. 
33 Id. 
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Justice John Marshall famously said: “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.”34 By “saying what the law is” the Dred Scott majority 
stripped the citizenship of millions of people and explicitly 
endorsed the notion that African-descended slaves were 
property with “no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect.”35 
B. SLAVERY HAD IMMENSE ECONOMIC VALUE.  
Racial superiority was not the sole motivation for 
perpetuating slavery. By 1860, slavery was the single most 
valuable asset in the South; more valuable than land, the 
railroads, and the banks. The total value of Southern 
agricultural land in 1860 was 2.3 billion dollars; slaves were 
valued at 3.1 billion dollars. 36  Emancipation would eliminate 
the value of slavery completely; that aspect of the economy 
would no longer exist. The complete elimination of the 
institution was a rational fear of the slave owners based on this 
immense value. To put this value in perspective, in 1860 the 
total valuation of all real property, personal property, and 
machinery, in the United States, was 16.1 billion dollars.37 That 
value was not distributed evenly—the industrial North was 
worth 9.7 billion dollars while the agrarian South was worth 6.3 
billion dollars.38 In the North, where many states had abolished 
slavery, the value of slavery was virtually nothing. However, in 
the South, slaves represented 3.1 of that 6.3 billion dollar whole. 
Slavery represented approximately 49% of the entire value of all 
property—real estate, personal property, and machinery—in 
the South. 
Based on these relative values, the Emancipation 
Proclamation had an immense effect on the Southern economy 
and little effect on the North. While the Emancipation 
Proclamation did not apply to the Northern states, the value of 
                                                 
34 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
35 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. 
36 GAVIN WRIGHT, SLAVERY AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
59-60 (2013) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 460-462); figures are in 1860 dollars. 
37 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES A 3-41, Table 2. 
38 WRIGHT, supra note 36, at 60. 




slavery to the North was essentially zero, so its effect was 
minimal. However, the instantaneous elimination of 49% of the 
property value in the South would affect every individual 
Southerner, slaver owner and non-slave owner alike.  
Abolition would have been a devastating economic 
blow to the South. While racial superiority is indisputably a 
significant motivating factor for the perpetuation of slavery, the 
economic factor likewise cannot be denied. Absent the racial 
factors, it is possible that the South would have just as 
aggressively pursued the war effort because abolition 
disproportionately affected the South to such a degree. Simply 
put, it was easy to be a Northern abolitionist because their 
livelihood did not depend on slavery. It was much harder to be 
a Southern abolitionist when the entire economy was 
structured around the institution. 
C. THE ARMY BECOMES THE TOOL OF EMANCIPATION  
Lincoln was conflicted by the Dred Scott decision.39 He 
valued and respected the law greatly but disagreed with the 
decision; he said: “[the Republican Party] think[s] the Dred Scott 
decision is erroneous . . . we shall do what we have to over-rule 
this.”40 In early 1861, General John C. Frémont, commander of 
the Union army in the West, escalated his approach to the 
prosecution of the war. He declared martial law in Missouri, 
proclaiming that any person caught bearing arms against the 
Union would be tried in a military court and executed if 
convicted. 41 Furthermore, any person caught aiding the rebels 
would have their slaves seized and emancipated.42 Lincoln did 
not agree with Frémont’s heavy-handed tactics and privately 
ordered him to cease.43 Lincoln needed the support of the pro-
Union slave states of Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and 
Delaware and did not want to risk turning them Confederate. 
When Frémont would not relent, Lincoln publicly reprimanded 
                                                 
39 DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 201 (1995). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 314.  
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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him, revoked his order, and removed Frémont from 
command.44 
In May 1861, Confederate General John Cary entered 
Union Fort Monroe, in Virginia, under a flag of truce seeking 
the return of two escaped slaves.45  He invoked the Fugitive 
Slave Clause of the Constitution as justification for their 
return. 46  General Benjamin Butler, commander of the fort,  
declared the slaves were “contrabands of war,” and were the 
equivalent of military property which could not be returned 
because they were directly furthering the war effort.47  Butler 
further considered the Confederacy to be a foreign country, in 
which the Fugitive Slave  Clause did not apply. 48 
By August, the Secretary of War issued guidance that all 
military commander should follow Butler’s precedent and to 
deny Confederates the return of their slaves.49 After the war, the 
Supreme Court of Texas derided this action as unconstitutional, 
stating in Hall v. Keese:  
Because the Constitution gives Congress the 
power to declare and fund war, any 
“contrabands of war” go to the Congress. The 
President merely prosecutes the war on behalf of 
Congress, so his orders to capture and free slaves 
was unconstitutional. lf the people of Texas were 
citizens of the United States during the rebellion 
they could not be deprived of their property 
without due process of law. If they were a part 
of another state or a de facto government, and 
they and their property were captured by the 
forces of the United States, it belonged to 
                                                 
44 Id. at 315. 
45  Robert Fabrikant, Lincoln, A Reluctant, But Still Great Emancipator: 
A Review of James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction Of Slavery 
In The United States, 1861-1865, 57 HOW. L. J. 93, 98 (2013). 
46  Id. 
47 UNITED STATES NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, FORT MONROE AND THE 









congress and not the commander-in-chief of the 
army to make rules concerning those captures.50  
President Lincoln later relied on this authority as Commander 
and Chief of the Army and Navy in the Emancipation 
Proclamation, which is based on the contraband of war theory 
first adopted by General Butler in 1861.51 
Congress codified Butler’s “contrabands of war” theory 
in the Confiscation Act of 1861.52 The Act statutorily authorized 
Union troops to seize rebel property used to further the 
rebellion.53 It explicitly included slaves, lumping them in with 
other property like horses, food, and weapons. 54  This Act 
codified the military order, which itself was based on the 
popular notion that slaves were property. That notion was 
reinforced by Dredd Scott. Each action—Dredd Scott, the 
Confiscation Act of 1861, and Butler’s proclamation—are an 
endorsement by the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
branches that the federal government regarded slaves as 
property; taking property required just compensation. 
IV. IN LIGHT OF TEXAS V. WHITE, DID THE CONFEDERATE 
STATES WARRANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION? 
A. THE CONFEDERATE STATES NEVER LEFT THE UNION. 
In 1851, the United States government issued $5,000,000 
in bonds to the state of Texas.55 The terms of the bond stated 
they were payable to the state of Texas or the bearer of bonds.56 
Each bond contained a statement that the debt was authorized 
by an act of Congress and was “transferable on delivery.”57 In 
1861, Texas still held the majority of the bonds.58 Later that year, 
                                                 
50 Hall v. Keese, 31 Tex. 504 (Tex. 1868) (emphasis added); this 
decision was published two months before Texas v. White. 
51 Emancipation Proclamation, infra note 74. 
52 Confiscation Act of 1861, 12 Stat. 319.  
53 DONALD, supra note 39, at 149. 
54 Id.; Confiscation Act, supra note 52. 
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Texas joined the Confederacy in rebellion against the United 
States.  
By 1862, Texas needed funds to prosecute the war. 
January 11, 1862 the Texas legislature passed an act “to dispose 
of any bonds and coupons which may be in the treasury on any 
account, and use such funds or their proceeds for the defence of 
the State”59 The United States bonds were sold for medicine and 
other supplies to support Texan and Confederate soldiers.60  
Following the Confederate defeat, Texas was 
readmitted into the United States as part of the broader 
reconstruction plan. In 1866, a state convention passed an 
ordinance seeking recovery of the bonds.61 It declared the sale 
was invalid because the rebel government was not authorized 
to sell or redeem the bonds, and the proceeds were used to take 
up arms against the United States.62 The Supreme Court ruled 
that Texas never left the Union: 
When Texas became one of the United States, she 
entered into an indissoluble relation. The union 
between Texas and the other States was as 
complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as 
the union between the original States. There was 
no place for reconsideration or revocation, 
except through revolution or through consent of 
the States. 
Considered as transactions under the 
Constitution, the ordinance of secession, 
adopted by the convention, and ratified by a 
majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts 
of her legislature intended to give effect to that 
ordinance, were absolutely null. They were 
utterly without operation in law. The State did 
not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be 
citizens of the Union.63  
                                                 
59 Id. at 705. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 708. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 700-01. 




The Court explained its holding by saying: “for States, like 
individuals, retain their identity, though changed, to some 
extent, in their constituent elements. And it was the State, thus 
constituted, which was now entitled to the benefit of the 
Constitutional guaranty.”64  
Based on White, it is for Congress to decide what 
government is the established government in a state. During the 
Civil War, the rights of Texas as a member of the Union, and the 
people of Texas as citizens of the Union were suspended. The 
state of Texas continued to be one of the United States, 
notwithstanding the ordinance of secession.65 
The holding in White contradicts the Constitution. For 
example: article IV, section two, clause one: “[t]he Citizens of 
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States.”66 White created a different set of 
rules for individuals depending on what state those individuals 
were in. According to White, the Constitution did not protect a 
citizen of Tennessee, being from a state in rebellion. However, 
a citizen of Kentucky, being just across the border, would have 
merited Constitutional protections based on that state’s status 
as a loyal member of the Union. On its face, this situation is 
adverse to article IV, section 2 because it creates different 
privileges and immunities depending on the individual’s 
citizenship. Additionally, White is agnostic to the individual’s 
loyalties. White justifies this position by stating that individuals 
in rebellion gave up their Constitutional protections by taking 
arms against the Union. 67  Almost certainly there were pro-
Confederacy Kentuckians and Tennesseans loyal to the Union. 
White does not make individual loyalty to the Union a necessary 
condition, only state citizenship. 
Furthermore, article VI, clause 2, the Supremacy Clause, 
declares “[t]his Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 68  This means that the 
Constitution trumps any other federal and state law. The 
Supremacy Clause establishes a base line that every law must 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 708. 
66 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
67 White, 74 U.S. at 733-34. 
68 U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. 
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conform to the provisions of the Constitution; therefore, the 
Constitution always applies. According to the Supremacy 
Clause, in a conflict between the Fifth Amendment and the 
Emancipation Proclamation, which is an executive order, the 
Fifth Amendment is controlling because it is a part of the 
Constitution. If the Fifth Amendment governs the action, then 
just compensation is required for a taking. Whether intentional 
or not, the White holding ran counter to the Supremacy Clause 
by favoring the Emancipation Proclamation over the Fifth 
Amendment. While freeing the slaves was undoubtedly the 
right moral action to take, the Supreme Court attempted to 
shoe-horn right moral action with the law with its Texas v. White 
decision. Rather than consistently apply the Constitution, the 
Court chose to do the morally right thing, and created law to do 
it. 
B. WHITE AS APPLIED BY A LOWER COURT. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee applied White in State 
v. President of Bank of Tennessee:69 
Tennessee existed as one of the States of the 
Union before the rebellion; it continued so 
during the rebellion. In the language of Chief 
Justice Chase, in Texas v. White, ‘the obligation of 
the State as a member of the Union, and of every 
citizen of the State as a citizen of the United 
States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It 
certainly follows that the State did not cease to 
be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the 
Union.’ The corresponding right of the citizens 
of the State to the protection of the laws of the 
United States was, for the time of the rebellion, 
suspended.  
Like Texas, Tennessee remained part of the United States, but 
the Constitution did not apply. There, the Bank of Tennessee 
was ordered to pay back debts outstanding prior to 1861. 
Priority was given first to the state, then to debts owed prior to 
                                                 
69 State v. President of Bank of Tenn., 64 Tenn. 1, 73 (Tenn. 1875). 




May 6, 1861.70 All claims after May 6, 1861, while the state was 
in rebellion, were “absolutely null and void” because the funds 
had been raised to further the war effort.71  Creditors whose 
claims were based on loans made after May 6 argued that the 
Constitution prohibited the nullification of a private contract. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee applied White when it held 
that Constitutional protections did not apply during the Civil 
War, therefore the General Assembly was justified in barring 
those debts.72 
This case is instructive as an example of the application 
of Texas v. White because it shows how a court was likely to rule 
in a case for emancipation-based compensation. A claim for just 
compensation based on emancipation would essentially claim 
that the government owed a debt to an individual slave owner. 
Like the creditors in Bank of Tennessee, the debt would arise out 
of the events of the Civil War. Applying White like the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee did, a court would likely hold that the Fifth 
Amendment did not protect the slave owner and no debt was 
owed. While that seems like the type of tyranny the Framers 
intended the Fifth Amendment to guard against, that is the 
logical conclusion to which the White decision leads. 
The White decision was a retroactive justification for 
right moral action. These cases are attempts to reconcile 
emancipation with practicality and the law. While 
emancipation was the right thing to do morally, the notion that 
the states never left the Union implies that the Constitution 
continued to apply to them. While paying just compensation for 
every slave in the South was an impractically large sum, that is 
what the Constitution required. However, emancipation was 
the right moral action and the courts constructed a justification 
for it. 
                                                 
70 On May 6, 1861 a referendum was held for the question of 
secession; it passed overwhelmingly. Tennessee officially became 
part of the Confederacy June 8, 1861. JAMES WALTER FERTIG, THE 
SECESSION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF TENNESSEE 24-26 (1898).   
71 Bank of Tenn., 64 Tenn. at 101. 
72 Id. at 165-66.; But see 12 Op. Att’y. Gen. 19 (1866) (stating “private 
debts are not annulled by war,” and further recommending that the 
government make restitution to a loyalist living in Virginia whose 
property was taken pursuant the Confiscation Act of 1861 but did 
not use that property to further the Confederate war effort.). 
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V. RECONCILING THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION WITH 
WHITE—THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
A. THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION 
Lincoln issued the “Preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation” on September 22, 1862.73 This preliminary order 
declared that on January 1, 1863 all slaves held in the 
Confederate States would be free; those states had one hundred 
days to reconcile and accept a gradual emancipation or that 
“the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and 
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts 
to repress such persons.” 74   Lincoln was aware of the legal 
implications of freeing slaves without compensation. 
Paragraph thirteen of the Preliminary Proclamation: 
And the executive will in due time recommend 
that all citizens of the United States who shall 
have remained loyal thereto throughout the 
rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the 
Constitutional relation between the United 
States, and their respective States, and people, if 
that relation shall have been suspended or 
disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts 
of the United States, including the loss of slaves. 
 
This means Lincoln, as the executive, would recommend that 
loyal slaveholders in the North be justly compensated for 
taking their slaves, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.  
Lincoln was careful to invoke his powers as 
Commander and Chief, enforcing the Proclamation through 
military force and limiting the scope to only states-in-rebellion. 
This may indicate he may have been unsure if the Constitution 
applied to the Confederacy or not; he distinguishes the point by 
saying: “if that relation has been suspended or disturbed,” not 
simply “that relation has been suspended.”75 (emphasis added)  
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It seems Lincoln recognized that a conflict existed: the 
morally right action was freeing the slaves, but the law 
regarded these individuals as property that required 
compensation. The constitutionality of the Emancipation 
Proclamation was never tested because of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.76 
B. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or 
any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation.77 
The Thirteenth Amendment constitutionalized the 
Emancipation Proclamation.78 The concise, clear meaning of 
the Thirteenth Amendment solves the Constitutional problem 
with emancipation: namely, the Fifth Amendment requirement 
of just compensation was no longer applicable and military 
force was not required for enforcement. The Thirteenth 
Amendment and Texas v. White attempted to legitimize the 
right moral action of emancipation with the law. Freeing the 
slaves was undoubtedly the right moral thing to do; in 1863 it 
was not yet the legal thing to do.  
When the states ratified the Thirteenth Amendment the 
abolition of slavery became Constitutional. With the White 
decision, the Emancipation Proclamation became retroactively 
legal. These acts attempted to reconcile the right moral action 
with the law. The Justices and Congressmen recognized the 
enormous economic impact of slavery’s abolition, and the Civil 
War in general, that would motivate compensation claims. 
Their only option was to fundamentally change the law. These 
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laws were part of the broader reconstruction context which 
sought to rebuild, reconcile, and move on from the war. The 
most effective way to do that was to ratify a broad change to the 
Constitution and reinterpret the law in such a way as to 
retroactively legitimize it.  
The Thirteenth Amendment is the answer to the 
inconsistency between the Fifth Amendment and the 
Emancipation Proclamation. It prevented the condition of 
slavery which lead to the taking by the Emancipation 
Proclamation. The Thirteenth Amendment effectively 
prevented any future litigation from arising because it made 
slavery explicitly, and indisputably, unconstitutional. The 
Texas v. White decision effectively cut off any potential takings 
litigation that might arise out of the Emancipation 
Proclamation. 
